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I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys, economists, and politicians have recently been
focusing their thoughts toward Europe, as the creation of the
European Economic Community (EEC) approaches in 1992.
However, here in the United States, talks about a North American
Free Trade Area (NAFIA) in the near future may prove even more
exciting than the creation of the EEC. Actually, a NAFTA, as
compared to the EEC, would have even greater legal, economic,
and political ramifications for the United States, North America,
and the entire world.' A NAFTA comprised of the United States,
Canada, and Mexico would have a combined population of about
355 million people and a combined annual output of about U.S.
$6.4 trillion.2 Comparatively, the twelve-nation EEC will contain
only 324 million people and produce U.S. $4 trillion annually.3
The possible creation of a NAFTA began on January 2, 1988
when Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan
signed the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA).4
Subsequently, talks about a United States-Mexico FrA indicate that
a trilateral trade agreement may be imminent.5 Although a U.S.-
Mexico FTA appears to be the next logical step in forming a
NAFTA, such an agreement may not come easily.6 The difficulties
inherent in establishing a U.S.-Mexico FTA are better understood
by examining the trade history of Mexico and the United States.
1. Wickens, A Giant Marketplace, MAcLEA's, Jan.25,1990, at20. SeeA NAFTA: Progress
and Obstacles, Bus. Latin Am., Apr. 30, 1990 [hereinafter A NAFTA].
2. Wickens, supra note 1, at 20. See McClenahen, Road to Mexico Will be Long: A Free
Trade Pact is Still Five Years Away, INDUSTRY WK., July 16, 1990, at 74.
3. Wickens, supra note 1, at 20.
4. D. STEoER, A CONCISE GuDETO THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AoREEMENT 1 (1988).
The agreement between Canada and the U.S. became effective on January 1, 1989. Id.
5. President Salinas Pledges Support for FTA, Bus. Latin Am., May 28,1990. See Mexico-
U.S. Accords Could Speed Up Future NAFTA, Bus. Latin Am., March 5, 1990 [hereinafter Mexico-
U.S. Accords]. But cf. The Mexico-Canada Trade FrameworkAgreement, Bus. Int'l, June 11, 1990
(Progress needs to be made before a North American trade union is achieved) (LEXIS, Report library,
Busint file).
6. Diffliculties Seen for U.S.-Mexican Free Trade Agreement, Reuter Lib. Rep., March 30,
1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file).
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I. TRADE HISTORY OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Mexico
Since the late 1930s, Mexican trade policies have protected
local producers and industries through enforced import licensing
requirements, high tariffs, and official import reference prices.7
Such measures encouraged foreign companies to construct plants
in Mexico, rather than export to Mexico and, thus, did not
stimulate sufficient development of Mexico's raw materials and
agriculture.8 Some Mexican economists recommended that the
government expose Mexican industry to greater price competition
by shifting from absolute protection of domestic industries,
characterized by import licensing, to more modest price
protection.9
In the past, the U.S. complained that Mexico was along for a
free ride in the international trading system, and sought to remain
so.' ° Additionally, the U.S. felt that Mexico, a relatively advanced
country with a reasonably well-developed industrial structure,
should make reciprocal contributions in international trade
negotiations.' In sum, the unpredictable Mexican trade policy
displeased the U.S.'" Furthermore, Mexico's protectionist
industrial and trade policies differed from those prescribed in the
7. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for
Future United States-Mexican Relations, Phase 1: Recent Trade and Investment Reforms Undertaken
by Mexico and Implications for the United States, USITC Pub. 2275, Inv. No. 332-282, at 4-1 (Apr.
1990) [hereinafter ITC Phase 1] (LEXIS, Itrade library, ITC file).
8. Ia
9. S. WEwmRAUB, FRm TRADE BmwEEN Mmaco AND Tm UNmD STATES? 41 (1984).
Mexico could achieve price competition with moderate tariffs varying according to the degree of
protection the country wished to grant different industries. Id.
10. Id at 55. In negotiations on tropical products, which preceded the multilateral trade
negotiations in the GAUT, the U.S. insisted on some degree of reciprocity in the 1977 agreement. In
the multilateral trade agreements themselves, U.S. negotiators complained that Mexico should show
some reasonable token of reciprocity to reflect its stage of development. Id See generally The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A7,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 187.
11. S. WEInRAUB, supra note 9, at 56.
12. Id.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to which the U.S.
was accustomed."3
During negotiations for Mexico's possible accession to the
GATT, Mexico clearly sought treatment as a developing
country.14 When Mexico's balance of payments began to
deteriorate in 1980, Mexico initially chose not to enter the GATT
and resorted to licensing to protect itself against imports.1 5
However, the weakness of the world oil market and the 1982 debt
crisis, which hurt Mexico's national economy, caused Mexico to
reassess its traditional trade policies. 6 Thus, in 1983, President
De La Madrid's administration announced its intention to open and
modernize the Mexican economy and make necessary structural
adjustments. 7 Slowly, Mexican policy makers began replacing
protectionist policies and reliance on oil exports with policies to
attract foreign investment, lower trade barriers, and increase
competitiveness in nonoil exports. 8
By August 1986, several months after a working party
examined Mexico's possible membership to the GATT, accession
took place and Mexico became the ninety-second contracting party
13. See id, at 40-41.
14. Id. at 42. The implications of being treated as a developing country include: entitlement
to receiving benefits from developed countries without being expected to provide equivalent benefits,
using export subsidies more freely than developed countries, reducing contention with other
contracting parties when nontariff techniques are used to develop domestic industry, and receiving
nonreciprocal preferential treatment from industrial countries. Id.
15. Id. at 45. See ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 2-1 (explaining that in 1986 Mexico was the
world's largest market economy country outside of the GATI).
16. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-1. See Trigueros, A Free Trade Agreement Between
Mexico and the United States?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE PoLIcY 255 (J. Schott ed.
1989) (maintaining that the extraordinary economic performance of some Southeast Asian countries
following export led growth economic strategies may also have played an important role in Mexico's
decision to break with traditional import substitution).
17. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-1.
18. Id. Mexico introduced trade liberalization in three stages. First, Mexico gradually opened
up its markets to foreign participation by simplifying the import tariff schedule, reducing import
license requirements, and eventually removing import license requirements from over 2000 categories
on Mexico's tariff schedule. Second, Mexico announced it would reapply for entry to the GAIT and
actually acceded to the GAIT in 1986, which in turn encouraged Mexico to remove import license
requirements, reduce tariffs, and generally move to a regime in which quantitative restrictions applied
only to a few selected economic sectors. Finally, President Salinas currently wishes to consolidate
and extend the reforms promulgated in the prior stages. Id. at 4-3.
556
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to the GATT.19 As part of its contribution to the GATT, Mexico
agreed to make tariff concessions, bring all customs valuation
procedures for imports into conformity with article VII of the
GATT,2° and eliminate its official pricing system.21 By entering
the GATT voluntarily, Mexico expressed a new policy of
commercial openness.' Some believe that the U.S. response to
Mexico's commercial openness was discouraging, because the U.S.
imposed new restrictions in its commercial law, bound tariffs to
Mexican exports of steel, and sustained textile quotas.' The trade
history of the U.S. illustrates how and why the U.S. responded to
Mexico's liberalization of its trade policy.
B. United States
Traditionally, the United States has practiced multilateralism
throughout its external trade policies.24 The U.S. has used the
GATT as its principal forum to launch major trade initiatives to
reduce trade barriers and discuss trade agreements.' Actually, the
GATT articles of agreement reasonably summarize the philosophy
that guides U.S. trade policy. 26
Historically, the U.S. has been one of the most open world
markets; duties are low and customs procedures are highly
transparent and predictable.2 As a result of this ease of export to
the United States, domestic U.S. competitors ensure that products
are free of injurious dumping or subsidization.28 Without such
19. Id. at 2-1. Mexico was permitted to accede to the GATT as a developing country.
20. See R. FOLSOM, M. GORDON & J. SPANOOLE, JR., 1989 DocuMMErs SuPPLaENT TO
INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS 30 (1989) (Article 7 of the GATT provides for valuation
of products for customs purposes).
21. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 2-2.
22. Lande, Posibilidades Para Ampliar El Intercambio Comercial Entre Estados Unidos y
Mexico, in LA ADHESION DE MECO AL GATT 304 (3. Tortes ed. 1989).
23. Id. at 313.
24. S. WEINTRAuB, supra note 9, at 40.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rosenbaum, U.S. Trade and Investment Policy TowardLatinAmerica, in TRADE, AID AND
U.S. ECONOMIC PoucY IN LATiN AMERICA 28 (H. Wiarda & . Perfit eds. 1983).
28. Id.
557
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protection, the U.S. government could not command the political
support necessary to keep an essentially open market.29
Through the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
the U.S. Congress had reigned supreme in regulating international
commerce.3" With the enactment of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, however, the U.S. Congress began to opt
out of regulating international commerce." From World War H
until the late 1960s, industries such as textiles, oil, and steel, which
were threatened by imports, sought protection and most actively
attempted to affect U.S. trade policy.
32
During the late 1960s and 1970s, competitive performance
decreased in a succession of U.S. industries and the U.S. economy
grew increasingly dependent on trade.33 Imports captured growing
shares of U.S. markets, initially in labor-intensive industries such
as apparel and footwear, and later in capital-intensive industries
such as automobiles and steel.' High-technology industries from
Japan and Western Europe now pose challenges to the U.S.
35
Since trade growth accompanied the U.S. decline in the relative
world economic position, more businesses sought trade
protection. 6
29. Id.
30. Destler, U.S. Trade Policymaking in the Uruguay Round, in DOMESTIc TRADE POLTIcs
AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 192 (H. Nau ed. 1989). See Devine, Free Trade with the United States,
in AssEsIG THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREM ENT 160 (M. Smith & F. Stone ed. 1987) (The
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act doubled tariffs and led to world-wide retaliation). Article I of the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the sole power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and also
provides Congress with the authority to "lay and collect ... Duties." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. In
contrast, article II of the U.S. Constitution, which sets forth the powers of the President, does not
address international trade. U.S. CoNsT. art. II.
31. Destier, supra note 30, at 192.
32. Id. at 195.
33. Morici, Impact on the United States, in BtM.DINO A CANADIAN-AMER CAN FREE TRADE
AREA 46 (E. Fried, F. Stone & P. Trezise eds. 1987).
34. Id.
35. Id. Japan and Western Europe are challenging U.S. high-tech industries such as
commercial aircraft, advanced electronics, and industrial machinery. Id.
36. Destler, supra note 30, at 196. Large, multinational corporations generally backed open
trade policies and though they did not typically take the initiative in lobbying politicians on trade
issues, they gave U.S. trade leaders their support. Id.
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In contrast to a surge of exports in the late 1970s, 37 the 1980s
saw the sharpest rise in imports in U.S. history." The ratio for
exports was plummeting? The egregious trade imbalance alarmed
virtually all U.S. producers of traded goods.40 Many producers
increased the pressure for strong government action to force
markets to open abroad or to close markets at home.4' Legislators
grew more conscious of the trade issues.42 Figures from the early
1980s illustrate the upward trend in U.S. protectionism toward
Mexican products in the U.S. market.43
U.S. trade policy in the early 1980s focused on launching a new
round of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT to extend
or expand the GATT's coverage of services, investment,
intellectual property, and agriculture." The U.S. viewed bilateral
agreements as building blocks for potential GATT accords and as
a fall-back in case the GATT talks failed.45
The FTA negotiation with Israel was the first U.S. attempt to
negotiate comprehensive trade liberalization on a bilateral basis.46
The U.S.-Israel FTA will result in the elimination of all tariffs on
37. Id at 197. The overall export surge from 1978 to 1980 built a consensus for the Tokyo
Round agreements. Id
38. Id. The 11.2%, as a share of U.S. goods production, to 15.7% increase from 1980 to 1985
was by far the sharpest such increase in modem U.S. history. kd
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Destler, supra note 30, at 197.
42. IX. at 198. Eventually, Congress adopted the Gephardt Amendment mandating U.S.
retaliation against nations that run larger trade imbalances with the U.S. unless these nations took
action to reduce such imbalances. Id. at 199.
43. Trigueros, supra note 16, at 265.
44. Schott, The Free Trade Agreement: A US Assessment, in FREE TRADE AOREEMENr. THE
GLOBAL IMPACT 10 (3. Schott & M. Smith eds. 1988).
45. Id. The bilateral approach also seemed to fit better with congressional skepticism about
the GAT'. The 1982 GATT Ministerial badly damaged the credibility of the GATT and led to efforts
to develop new U.S. trade legislation that would protect U.S. trading interests more effectively and
expeditiously than GATT procedures. Id. See Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE
AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLIcy 7 (J. Schott ed. 1989) (voicing concern of whether the GATT
negotiations can actually achieve substantial trade reforms that promote the economic welfare of the
member countries, expressing criticism that the GATT process is too slow compared to the shorter
time needed to establish bilateral agreements, and that the GAIT talks, which must accommodate the
interests of the 96 member countries, has become too complicated).
46. Schott, supra note 45, at 5. However, Israel does not account for a significant share of
overall U.S. trade. Id.
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bilateral trade by 1995.' Building on the success of the U.S.-
Israel talks, the U.S. and Canada subsequently entered into FrA
negotiations.4" The U.S.-Canada FrA aims to eliminate tariffs and
nontariff barriers (NTBs), reduce restrictions on trade in services
and investment, and promote entry of business persons into each
country's territory.41 The U.S.-Canada FTA illustrates the issues
a U.S.-Mexico FrA will need to address.
III. THE ARCHETYPAL U.S.-CANADA FTA
A. Accomplishments of the U.S.-Canada FTA
The U.S.-Canada FTA, which entered into force in 1989,
eliminates all tariffs on bilateral trade within ten years. It also
opens up more government contracts to competitive bidding and
bars most border restraints on bilateral energy trade. The U.S.-
Canada FTA establishes innovative approaches to dispute
settlement." Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, negotiators will
establish new channels for intergovernmental communication and
consultation as well as bilateral mechanisms for dispute
settlement.5' If the U.S. and Mexico were to enter into an FTA,
the U.S.-Canada FrA could serve as the archetype for such an
agreement.
Trade experts view the U.S.-Canada FTA as a success because
it increases access to the U.S. market and creates the opportunity
for even greater entry in the future.52 In addition, proponents of
47. Id. The FTA also includes a framework agreement which commits each country to make
best efforts to negotiate substantive rules on services. Id.
48. Id.
49. D. STaGER, supra note 4, at 2.
50. Schott, supra, note 45 at 6. Generally, Canada sought more secure access to tho U.S.
market through both trade liberalization and greater certainty about how the U.S. would administer
its trade laws. The U.S. focused primarily on improved rulemaking as well as trade liberalization for
its industries. Id.
51. D. STEGER, supra note 4, at 2.
52. M. GOLD & D. LEYToN-BRowN, TRADE-OFFs ON FREE TRADE 65 (1988). The FrA also
increased Canada's security of access to the U.S. market Id.
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the U.S.-Canada FrA feel that the FITA will not constrain Canada's
government from enacting policies in the country's best interest.53
Tariff reductions and rules of origin should instantly affect the
production plans of most businesses.54 Under the FTA, the
countries will remove some tariffs immediately and others in equal
stages over several years.5 The FTA classifies all dutiable
products into different categories for this purpose.56 Under the
rules of origin, the FTA only entitles preferential treatment to
dutiable goods originating in either Canada or the United States. 57
The FTA, although ground-breaking in the area of trade
services, remains cautious in this area.5 ' The FTA covers services
such as agriculture, forestry, mining, construction, distributive
trades, insurance, and real estate.59 Under the GATT concept of
national treatment of services, the two countries have agreed to
treat persons or firms of the other country no less favorably than
their own nationals with respect to covered services.'
Additionally, a separate chapter in the FTA covers federally
regulated financial services."' However, this chapter only applies
to insurance services and excludes securities, banks and trusts, and
loan companies.'
53. Id. at 66. This expert explained that the FTA would not constrain Canada's policies since
the principle of national treatment allows each country the sovereign right of independent policy as
long as that policy does not act as a discretionary trade or investment barrier. Id.
54. D. STEOER, supra note 4, at 3.
55. M. SMITH & F. STONE, ASSESSING THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AoREEMENT 7 (1987).
56. D. STEGER, supra note 4, at 6. Either country may accelerate bilateral tariff reductions
where both countries agree. Id.
57. Id. at 8. Without rules of origin, a foreign company could simply export goods to the U.S.,
pay the U.S. duty and then arrange to ship the goods duty free, thus avoiding the Canadian duty that
would otherwise have been payable if the goods were exported directly. As a general principle, goods
will be considered to originate in either country, or both, where they are wholly produced or obtained
in either Canada, the U.S., or both, or where they have been sufficiently changed in either country
so as to meet the FTA rules of origin tests. Id.
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 54.
60. l The FTA provision of covered services includes (1) production, distribution, sale,
marketing, delivery, and purchase of a covered service; (2) access to and use of domestic distribution
systems; (3) establishment of a commercial presence for distributing, marketing, delivering or
facilitating the covered service; and (4) any investment for the provision of a covered service. Id. at
55.
61. Id. at 57.
62. Id.
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B. Concerns the U.S.-Canada FTA Raises
Experts argue that under the U.S.-Canada FTA, Canada did not
achieve its objectives but the U.S. did.63 Opponents of the FTA
believe that Canada gave the U.S. greater access to the Canadian
market and to investment opportunities than Canada received in
return.' Thus, Canada's bargaining position may be weaker in
future negotiations."5 Some experts also believe that Canada's
access to the U.S. market is no more secure now under the FTA
than it was before its inception.' Finally, opponents argue that
Canada has suffered a serious loss of political authority and that
Canada will inevitably be forced to harmonize their policies with
those of the U.S.67
One major barrier that concerns Canadians is the U.S.
application of countervailing duties (CVDs) against subsidies and
alleged dumping. Canadian firms have less financial resources to
undertake such expensive legal battles.68 Canadians maintain that
U.S. firms bring frivolous suits as a way of discouraging fair
competition when it hurts them and what Americans define as
subsidies are what Canadians view as legitimate regional and
industrial assistance programs. 69 The threat of U.S. CVD cases
constrains Canada's ability to undertake regional development and
63. M. GOLD & D. LzYTON-BROWN, supra note 52, at 65.
64. Id. Arguably, since Canada receives less from the U.S. in return, this exacerbates the
existing economic and political imbalance between the two countries. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 66. Such a loss in Canada's political authority may constrain the future Canadian
government from making policy in Canada's national interest.
68. Morici, supra note 33, at 55. See generally Pattison, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Law, in INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACIONS 502 (R. Folsom, M. Gordon & . Spanogle, Jr.
eds. 1986). A countervailing duty is a customs levy designed to offset the effect of government
payments and other economic benefits, generally referred to as subsidies, granted to foreign producers
or exporters which distort competition in international trade. Il at 527. The U.S. also regards selling
goods at less than fair value (so-called "dumping") as an unfair trade practice. Fair value is the
amount charged for a good in the nation from which the good was exported. An antidumping duty
is imposed when such sales threaten material injury to a domestic industry or retard its development.
ICE
69. Morici, supra note 33, at 55.
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industrial adjustment policies and discourages small Canadian firms
from exporting to or pricing aggressively in the U.S. market.70
However, the two countries have agreed under the FTA to
develop and implement, within a period of five to seven years, a
substitute system of antidumping and CVD laws applicable to
Canada and the U.S. 7 As a joint working group develops the new
system of laws, both countries will continue to apply their own
antidumping and CVD laws.72 Meanwhile, a new binational panel
will review final antidumping and CVD orders in the countries."
Canada's preoccupation with the U.S.-Canada FTA stems from
a fear of the large and affluent American market, and the pervasive
influence of U.S. investment, culture, and politics on the Canadian
economy and social institutions.74 However, all international trade
agreements by their nature involve some sacrifice of national
sovereignty if they are adhered to and respected.75 Actually, the
Canadian government has already shared with Mexican officials
their fears, as well as their knowledge, gained during the U.S.-
Canada trade negotiations. 7' A U.S.-Mexico FTA presents some
of the same concerns which the U.S.-Canada FTA raised.
70. Id.
71. D. STEGER, supra note 4, at 73.
72. Id. Thus, Canadian and U.S. firms may continue to bring antidumping or countervailing
duty cases against importers from the other country under the current domestic laws and procedures.
Id.
73. Id The binational panel review process offers several major advantages over the current
system. The binational panel process will reduce the time for final resolution of antidumping and
CVD cases. Also, with binational panelists rather than with a single judge, the review panels should
encourage different interpretations of U.S. and Canadian trade laws. Further, the binational review
procedure will provide a cost advantage for small and medium-sized businesses. Id. at 74.
74. Morici, supra, note 33 at 44.
75. Id. at 45. Trade agreements between nations are analogous to contracts between individuals
since both constrain signatories to undertake or abstain from actions even if circumstances should
change. Countries accept such constraints on their future policy options in return for perceived
benefits. Id.
76. Green, Mexican Businesses Welcome Move Toward Free Trade Pact, L CoM. & COM.,
June 13, 1990, at 4A.
563
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IV. IMPLEMMNTiMNG THE U.S.-MExco
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. The Growing U.S.: Mexico Trade Relationship-Groundworkfor
a Possible FTA
In recent years, the U.S. and Mexico have gradually improved
bilateral trade relations. 7 By 1986, Mexican exports to the U.S.
accounted for as much as sixty-seven percent of Mexico's total
exports.7" Recently, Mexico has been importing at least two-thirds
of its total imports from the U.S. 79 For the U.S., trade with
Mexico has also been growing.8" Mexico is now the third highest
importer of American exports and fourth highest source of
American imports."' At the Mexican Senate's recent National
Consultation Forum on Commercial Relations of Mexico with the
World, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari called for additional
growth in Mexico's international trade and explained that no nation
in the next century can isolate themselves from the new currents of
changes.3 2 The maquiladora industry illustrates this growing U.S.-
Mexico trade relationship and marks some of the first steps the
countries took toward trade union.13
The maquiladora industry, commonly referred to as the in-bond
industry, was established in 1965 under Mexico's Border
Industrialization Program (BIP), as an experiment in production
sharing.8' Under the BIP, the Mexican government authorized
77. K. FATEn, U.S.-Ma mcAN ECONOMIC RmATIONS 4 (1988).
78. Id. at 4. This figure surpassed 70% in 1987. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id.
82. Salinas, Cinco premisas sobre las relaciones comerciales con el exterior, in FoRo SoBan
LA Po~irlcA COMERCAL DE MEXIco 524 (1990). Salinas further explained that the sign of the times
is in the end of the rigidity of political thought and of closed practices. Id.
83. See L. LANGLEY, MEXAMmUCA 32 (1988); ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 5-13. See also
Ti'mnins, Come Canada, Come Mexico, Come All the World, FOREIGN SERV. J., Mar. 1990, at 28
CThe Mexican state of Sonora shares a unique relationship with its northern neighbor, Arizona).
Sonora and Arizona constitute the first province-level binational commission in the world, where the
governors of the two states meet regularly to discuss cross-border problems and policies. They have
created a special development fund financed by the states and their private sectors.
84. K. FAT&&, supra note 77, at 105.
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businesses to establish industrial plants for the assembly,
processing, and finishing of foreign materials and components.85
The Mexican government collects no duty on these imports
provided all finished products are exported and none are kept or
sold in Mexico. 6 In the U.S., industries took advantage of two
special tariff provisions, Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (TSUS) items
806.30 and 807.00, where U.S. Customs levies duty only on the
value added by the foreign processing on the U.S. products
processed or assembled in Mexico. 7
The maquiladora program aims to generate foreign exchange,
develop employment opportunities for a rapidly expanding labor
force, and foster increased regional development." In sum, the
maquiladora industry has created employment opportunities, trained
and developed employees, and transferred knowledge at the
technical and administrative levels. 9  The maquilas allow
American companies to compete effectively with aggressive
competitors abroad.' ° The recent U.S.-Mexico trade harmonization
merely begins with the maquiladora industry.
In late 1987, the United States and Mexico concluded
negotiations on the Framework of Principles and Procedures for
Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment Relations [hereinafter
Framework Agreement]. 9' The Framework Agreement,
emphasizing the importance of liberalized trade between the two
85. Id. Under the BIP, the Mexican government allows the businesses to import the
equipment, machinery, materials and component parts necessary for production.
86. Id. The Mexican government has expanded the BIP to permit establishment of plants in
economically depressed areas in the Mexican interior. Id.
87. Id. See L. LANGLEY, supra note 83, at 35. Although Mexican labor was more expensive
than Oriental labor, companies realized early that the savings in shipping and the ability to pull out
quickly in case of political trouble made the Mexican border towns more attractive for investment.
Id.
88. K. FATEIN, supra note 77, at 106. Supporters of the maquiladora industry believe the
industry continues to train people in the industrial process and contributes to a knowledge transfer
that will spill over into other parts of the Mexican economy. Id.
89. Id. at 112. As the more technologically advanced companies use more sophisticated
methods ofjob design and provide more advanced training, employees have greater opportunities for
participation and decision making. Id. at 113. But cf. L LANGLEY, supra note 83, at 37, 39
(explaining some of the negative aspects of the maquiladora industry).
90. K. FATEM, supra note 77, at 36.
91. iTC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 2-3.
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countries, served as a catalyst that improved U.S.-Mexico trade and
investment relations.' Primarily, the Framework Agreement
provided a mechanism for Mexico and the U.S. to consult on trade
issues, to resolve disputes, and to negotiate the removal or
reduction of trade barriers.93
Since the Framework Agreement, the two countries have
reached additional agreements.' One of the agreements, the
Textile Agreement, expanded textile trade between the two
countries.95 The Textile Agreement raised the U.S. import quotas
on Mexican textile and apparel products and reserved a portion of
the increased quota for a special regime of textiles.96 Under the
Textile Agreement, Mexico increased its textile exports to the U.S.
annually by 60%.' In return, Mexico lowered its trade barriers to
U.S. exports of yarns and so-called "white goods" fabrics and
began phasing out import license requirements for most textiles and
garments. 98
Most recently, the Mexican and U.S. Presidents signed the
Understanding Between the Government of the United Mexican
States and the Government of the United States of America
Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks (TIFTs).99 The
TIFTs build on the continuing work of the 1987 Framework
Agreement."°  However, the TIFTs may represent a more
significant milestone for bilateral commercial relations between the
two countries than does the Framework Agreement because (1) it
provides for comprehensive trade and investment negotiations, (2)
92. Id at 2-4 to -5. The Framework Agreement highlighted the elimination of nontariff
barriers, detrimental effects of protectionism, export earnings' effect on Mexico's ability to meet its
foreign debt obligations, GATTs role in the bilateral trade relationship, and increased significance
of services in both countries. Id at 2-3.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2-5.
95. Id. Another agreement covered steel and alcoholic beverages. Id.
96. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 2-5. Under the special regime a portion of each quota,
ranging from 50% to 90% is reserved for imports manufactured from U.S.-formed and U.S.-cut
fabric. The countries negotiated this agreement under the auspices of the Multifibre Arrangement. Id
97. Id.
98. Id. White goods fabrics include bleached cotton and linen used in the production of
domestic products such as tablecloths, sheets, and pillow cases. Id.
99. Id at 2-6.
100. id
566
1991 / U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
negotiations under the TTs focus on both specific product areas
and cross-sectoral issues, and (3) binational teams of government
experts conduct information gathering and analysis prior to
negotiations in order to facilitate the resolution of issues.''
Apparently, U.S.-Mexico economic agreements over the past
few years have cemented an already strong U.S.-Mexico
relationship.'0 2 Most recently, President Salinas strengthened this
bilateral relationship by reshaping Mexico's economic policy with
a market-oriented framework.0 3 Because the U.S. has always
been Mexico's largest trading partner, Mexican officials say that a
FTA would not change anything but would merely formalize an
existing relationship.'0 4  In the words of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Ambassador Carla Hills, "With the change we have
seen in Latin America, and certainly very, very visible... in the
Salinas Administration... we want to capitalize on that change,
make it permanent and create the opportunity for expansion of
trade."' 105
B. Specific Issues the U.S.-Mexico FTA Should Consider
1. Tariff Laws and Nontariff Trade Barriers
When negotiating a FTA, the U.S. and Mexico should consider
eliminating import tariffs as well as nontariff barriers including:
import quotas, licenses, technical barriers, differences in product
101. Id.
102. Oppenheimer, Mexico Boosts NTes with U.S. as Pact on Free Trade Nears, Miami Herald,
Aug. 19, 1990, at 28A, col. 1. As the percentage of Mexico's total exports going to the U.S. has been
increasing, the percentage of Mexico's total exports going to Latin America and the Caribbean has
been decreasing. Id.
103. Bush and Mexican President Salinas Agree to Move Toward Free Trade Agreement, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 834 (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter Bush and Salinas]. The Salinas
administration has already set tariffs at 20%, eliminated most import licensing requirements,
liberalized foreign investment rules, committed to strengthen intellectual property rights protection,
and has privatized many state enterprises. Id.
104. Oppenheimer, supra note 102, at 28A, col. 1.
105. Hearing of the Trade Subcomm. of the House Ways and Means Comm. on US-Mexico
Relations, Fed. News Serv., June 14, 1990 [hereinafter Trade Subcomm.] (statement of Ambassador
Carla Hills).
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specifications and standards, subsidies, 6 lack of access to
services, 7 and intellectual property rights such as patents and
copyrights.0 8 One expert contends that if free trade means
merely dismantling tariffs, although free trade would significantly
affect some Mexican products sold in the U.S., free trade would
not significantly affect all products. 1°9 Actually, some believe
U.S. tariffs are no longer overwhelming.110 However, because
Mexican tariffs and nontariff barriers are substantially greater than
those in the U.S., eliminating these barriers could stimulate U.S.
export to Mexico."'
On the other hand, under TSUS items 806.30 and 807.00, some
assembly industries in Mexico produce products which, when
reentering the U.S., benefit from the necessity to pay duty only on
the value added outside the U.S."' Further, two protectionist
aspects of current Mexican trade policy still exist: the lack of
uniformity of import tariffs and the prevalence of import permits
in some sectors of the economy. 3 As Mexico negotiates a FTA
with the U.S., it will probably focus on tariffs on its labor-intensive
106. Morici, supra note 33, at 53. Subsidies raise the concern of foreign governments' use of
direct and indirect financial incentives to maintain employment in industries. Id.
107. Id. at 54. Access to services concerns clear rules of market access in areas such as
accounting, insurance, investment, and commercial banking. Id.
108. Id. See Trade Subcomm, supra note 105 (Negotiators may consider patent law covering
pharmaceutical products). See also AFL-CIO Tells House That New FTA Between U.S.-Mexico Would
Harm U.S. Workers, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1001 (July 4, 1990) [hereinafter AFL-CIO] (A FTA
also warrants establishment of a trade and investment dispute settlement mechanism).
109. S. WEDrNRAuB, supra note 9, at 5. But cf. Barreda, Tariffs and Customs Rules, in
UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 132 (D. McRae & D. Steger ed. 1988). As was the
case with Canada, removal of tariffs could help U.S. and Mexican firms service both markets and
allow factories to achieve greater economies of scale. The countries would become more competitive
worldwide, and consumers could benefit from lower prices as well as higher quality goods. Id.
110. S. WEnTrRAUB, supra note 9, at 5.
111. Id, But see Trigueros, supra note 16, at 259. Mexican tariffs have reached reasonably low
levels as of December 1987, having been reduced from a range of 0% to 100% to a range of 0% to
20%. Id. Additionally, one expert's figures show that the incidence of nontariff barriers (NTBs) on
Mexican potential exports is particularly low, although the effects of nontariff barriers on some
specific economic sectors at times is dramatic. Id at 264-65.
112. S. WEINrRAUB, supra note 9, at 5. Since January 1, 1988, the comparable provisions are
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) items 9802.00.6000 and 9801.00.8000,
respectively.
113. Trigueros, supra note 16, at 259.
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intensive products, which provide the greatest competitive
advantage because of low Mexican wages." 4
Additionally, the two countries may consider the order of
eliminating tariffs. Perhaps the countries will develop a
classification scheme, similar to the U.S.-Canada system which
designates when particular products attain duty free status. Initial
agreements between Mexico and the U.S. already call for the
countries to identify industries and export products that could
benefit from lower tariffs. 115 As the countries eliminate tariffs,
they should ensure that tariffs on both sides are cut at equal rates
and on products of equal value. 1 6 A tariff-cut on a certain
product in the U.S. could have disparate ramifications when cut on
the same product in Mexico. Thus, both countries need to take into
account the effect such a product and its tariff have on each
country's overall economy.
As the U.S. and Mexico determine what products qualify for
duty-free treatment, they will also need to establish clear rules of
origin."7 Rules of origin provide that a significant change in an
imported product allows the product to qualify for duty-free
treatment." 8  The U.S.-Mexico FTA should consider what
constitutes or defines origin as did the U.S.-Canada FTA. 119
Finally, although recent agreements call for an increase in
quotas on both sides of the border, this area of trade law still
mandates equal changes from both countries. As previously
discussed, the Textile Agreement recently increased textile trade
114. Bush and Salinas, supra note 103, at 835.
115. Crow, U.S-Canada Free Trade Agreement to End Smooth First Year, Face Tests, OIL &
GAS J., Dec. 11, 1989, at 18.
116. See Barreda, supra note 109, at 131.
117. Ritchie, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in UNDERSTANDiNr THE FREE TRADE
AGRENIENT 10 (D. McRae & D. Steger eds. 1988).
118. Id.
119. BARREDA, supra note 109, at 132. Canada objected to having the rule of origin based on
substantial transformation since it is a subjective rule. Therefore Canada wanted to follow its current
practice of using value to determine the country of origin. Since the U.S. believed it was difficult to
verify value and such a practice would create a great burden for businesses, the two countries had
long negotiations to determine what should constitute sufficient processing or assembly to confer
origin. Id.
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between the two countries by raising quotas.12 Although few
quotas actually remain, Mexico still requires domestic content in
specific products."' Furthermore, the U.S. Senate continues to
pass legislation curbing textile and apparel imports." Thus, a
FTA's cutting tariffs and quota restrictions should have great
appeal to both countries.
2. Services and Investment
The elements of services and investment are still new territory
for most international trade agreements."z Although not normally
included in FTAs, initial talks show that Mexico and the U.S.
intend to deal with investment issues. 24 The countries may
establish sectoral policies, as in the U.S.-Canada FTA, which
maintain restrictions for investment in some industries while
keeping other industries open."z When investors determine which
industrial sectors offer the greatest benefits, and they invest, this
will show which sectors provide investors with enhanced, secure
access to the market as a whole.1 26
Furthermore, Mexico has greatly liberalized its investment
rules.127 In many instances, foreign companies are allowed 100%
ownership and the government grants quick investment
120. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 2-5.
121. IBC USA IjCENSINa, INc., PoLmcAL RISKS SERVICES, COUNTRY REPORT ON MEXICO:
18 MONTH FORECASTS OF 'TADE RESTICTONS (Aug. 1990) (LEXIS, Report library, Rptibc file).
122. Barrett, Senate Passes Textile Bill 68-32, WOMEN's WEAR DAILY, July 18, 1990, at 15.
123. Ritchie, supra note 117, at 13.
124. Agendafor Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Talks Said to be Wide Open at this Point, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 956 (June 27, 1990).
125. See generally Ritchie, supra note 117, at 14.
126. Id.
127. Mongelluzzo, U.S. and Mexico Seen Poised For Trade Pact, J. COM. & COMMEmCIAL,
July 3, 1990. See Bus. INT'L FOREcASnNO SERVICEs, MEXICO: POuCY TOWARDS FOREION
INVESTMENT (Oct. 1989) (LEXIS, Report library, Bifsvc file). Mexico's new foreign investment
regulations automatically permit 100% foreign ownership provided that the following six conditions
are met: "(1) new investment sh[all] not exceed $100 million; (2) investment funds come entirely
from abroad; (3) projects are outside the congested industrial zones... ; (4) imports and exports are
kept in balance during the first three years; (5) investments create permanent jobs and provide
training, educational and personal development programmes for workers; and (6) [investors use]
technology adequate to the project" and obey environmental regulations. Id
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approval.1 28 Actually, U.S. investors may even have opportunities
to finance increased oil production. '29
The Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior [hereinafter
Bancomext], Mexico's national bank for foreign trade, conducts
most of Mexico's financing and promotional programs for
exports."0 Historically, Mexico's principal mechanism for
providing credit to its export sector has been the Fund for the
Promotion of Exports of Mexican Manufactured Products
(FOMEX)."' FOMEX will merge with Bancomext in 1990 as the
programs of the two combine into the Bancomext structure.
132
Although the Mexican government continues to prohibit foreign
banks from operating in Mexico, recent Mexican law contemplates
new foreign bank branch offices opening in Mexico that could
perform certain banking functions with nonresidents. 3 3 The
creation of large financial groups is an important step in preparing
local financial institutions for direct foreign bank participation in
Mexico. l3
Additionally, recent Mexican law allows foreign participation,
of up to 49%, in Mexican insurance companies. 1 35  Some
economic analysts believe that President Salinas will negotiate
foreign majority ownership in the insurance companies as part of
a FTA with the U.S. Finally, new technology transfer rules
recognize franchises by name and allow the parties in an agreement
128. See Mongelluzzo, supra note 127; Bus. INT'L FoRacAsTio SmEVlcES, supra note 127.
129. Marquis, Trade 77es to Mexico in '91 Seen, Miami Herald, Sept. 18, 1990, at 12A, col.
1.
130. ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-19.
131. Id. FOMEX provides an array of programs for Mexican manufacturers and exporters but
its major offerings are preexport and export financing. Id.
132. Id.
133. Law on Sale of Commercial Banks to Private Investors Introduced, Bus. INT'L, July 9,
1990 (LEXIS, Report library, Busint file).
134. Id. Officials of the Salinas administration will likely use the prospect of foreign bank
competition as a bargaining chip to obtain certain concessions from the U.S. during FTA negotiations.
Id.
135. British Insurance Firm Acquires 43% of Seguros La Republica, Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 20,
1990.
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to set their own terms and conditions.136 Lawyers claim that the
government has curbed much of its discretionary power in this
area. 137 Franchising complements the underlying theory of the
U.S.-Mexico FTA, since a franchise enables a company to expand
in a new market and also obtain royalties. 3
Although Mexico has already enacted reforms in both the
service and investment sectors, Mexico retains broad restrictions on
foreign ownership of existing assets and on foreign firms in the
financial services sector.139 Thus, a U.S.-Mexico FTA will need
to fully contemplate how accessible each country's banking,
financing, and investment services will be to the other. 40 It
remains to be seen whether negotiators will adopt national
treatment of services, characteristic of the U.S.-Canada FTA, and
whether negotiators will also harmonize the countries' financial
services such as banking. Although the FTA would probably first
address the merchandise trade, a FTA would probably include
services and investments later.'41
3. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws
Every postwar agreement creating a free trade area has raised
the issue of how to treat antidumping and countervailing duty
(CVD) laws.'42 Some policy experts argue that existing national
laws, such as antitrust laws, already address concerns about unfair
business practices. 143 Most legislators, however, do not view
136. Franchises Fast Becoming New Business Option, Bus. Latin Am., July 2, 1990. New
interest in franchises stems from Mexico's entry in the GATT, new rules governing foreign
investment and technology transfer, some recovery in GDP growth, and a stable peso-dollar parity.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. However, Mexican retailing and business practices which are significantly different
than those of the U.S. may provide an obstacle to opening a successful franchise in Mexico. Id.
139. The Whole Nine Yards, J. CoM. & CoM., June 13, 1990. However, under the GATr,
bilateral free trade agreements must span all areas of trade covered by the GAIT in order to be legal.
Id.
140. See Ritchie, supra note 117, at 13.
141. Green, supra note 76, at 4A.
142. Hudec, An Approach to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, in BUILDINO A
CANADIAN-AMERCAN FREE TRADE AREA 111 (E. Fried, F. Stone & P. Trezise eds. 1987).
143. Id. at 113.
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unfair trade laws as fundamentally wrong policy since such laws
have become an economic necessity in many political systems.
44
Some experts claim to improve antidumping and CVD laws by
correctly defining basic concepts inherent in the laws, such as
dumping, subsidy, or industry.145 The U.S. and Mexico will need
to consider how to standardize their antidumping and CVD laws as
they negotiate a FrA.
146
The antidumping and CVD laws between the two countries
differ from each other in a number of respects. 47 Under its laws,
Mexico may impose a provisional duty within five working days
after initiating a proceeding, before foreign exporters or Mexican
importers have notice of or have an opportunity to participate in
the proceeding.1 48 The analogous U.S. law requires posting a cash
bond for each importation of allegedly dumped or subsidized
merchandise.1 49 In contrast, the bond in the U.S. provision cannot
be imposed until at least eighty-five days after filing a CVD
petition or 160 days after filing an antidumping petition.150
Furthermore, unlike Mexican law, U.S. law provides parties to an
antidumping or CVD investigation access to confidential
information submitted during the investigation and the ability to
participate in public hearings.15' U.S. proceedings also move
more rapidly than Mexican proceedings.'52
Potentially, a U.S.-Mexico FTA would tend to create an almost
automatic self-help remedy. 3 A duty-free border could permit
competitors in the importing country to ship dumped imports back
to the point of origin. 54 Such reverse dumping could act as an
144. Id.
145. Id. at 114.
146. See generally irC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-16 to -17 (Mexico has seldom initiated CVD
investigations, although it has used antidumping procedures more extensively, and that Mexico has
directed considerably more antidumping cases against the U.S. than any other country).
147. Id. at 4-15.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 1TC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-16.
152. Id.
153. Hudec, supra note 142, at 115.
154. Id.
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deterrent to dumping. 155 Ideally, the U.S.-Mexico FTA should
contain provisions, such as a right to return any exported good to
the country of origin, which explicitly promote reverse
dumping. 156
Fortunately, both countries have already reached some
agreement regarding antidumping and CVDs which should help the
U.S. and Mexico during their FTA negotiations.1 7 In April 1985,
the U.S. and Mexico concluded a three-year bilateral Understanding
on Subsidies and CVDs [hereinafter Subsidies Agreement]. 58
Under the Subsidies Agreement, the U.S. agreed to conduct an
injury test in CVD investigations of Mexican imports; in exchange,
Mexico agreed to eliminate the export subsidy elements on its
CEDI tax incentives program.159 In contrast, the Canadians and
Americans had not reached a similar agreement regarding their
antidumping and CVD provisions upon entering into their joint
FTA. 60 However, a recent International 'Trade Commission (ITC)
decision illustrates the frictions that still persist between the
countries in the dumping area. 61
The countries need a bilateral mechanism to resolve future
disputes." Perhaps, as part of the solution, the countries will
adopt a binational panel review process similar to the one which
the U.S.-Canada FTA provides. As the countries explore the
155. Id.
156. Id. In addition, resale price maintenance laws which enforce exclusive licenses or
distributorship may prove valuable in the area of dumping. Ultimately, Mexico and the U.S. may use
such laws to prevent price discrimination along with the uniform application of antitrust and other
competition laws. Id.
157. See generally ITC Phase 1, supra note 7, at 4-18.
158. Id. at 4-18.
159. Id. The CEDI is the Rebate Certificates for Indirect Taxes program. In addition to this
concession, Mexico would not establish or maintain pricing practices concerning energy or basic
petrochemical products that were export subsidies and Mexico would also phase out the export
subsidy element of its pre-export and export financing programs. Id.
160. See generally D. SnGaER, supra note 4, at 73.
161. US-Mexico Trade Tensions Follow US Anti-Dumping Case, Bus. Latin Am., Sept. 24,
1990. An ITC ruling that Mexican cement producers have dumped cement on the US market hurt
giant Mexican cement firms such as Cemex. Cemex products now face a 58% duty, meanwhile, the
company has forfeited approximately $16 million in bonds to compensate aggrieved cement producers
in the U.S. Id.
162. Id.
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possibility of a FICA, Mexico and the U.S. should exhibit care and
restraint before initiating unfair trade practice investigations and
should not entertain frivolous complaints.163
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of a U.S.-Mexico FTA
1. Advantages for Mexico
Most experts cite the many advantages that would accrue to
Mexico from a FTA with the U.S. First, a FTA between the two
countries could provide Mexico with secure access to the U.S.
market and reduce the frequency of U.S. unfair trade sanctions on
Mexican imports."6 Access to the U.S. market would provide
Mexico with greatly needed technology, heavy machinery, and
high-tech products. 65 Optimistic Mexicans believe that access to
the U.S. will also help resolve trade disputes."
Second, a U.S.-Mexico FTA could increase employment in
Mexico due to a creation of jobs from the anticipated increase in
investment and the opening of the U.S. market.' 67 It is not
necessarily true that one, large barrier-free market would lead to
the concentration of complex industrial production jobs in the U.S.
and would leave raw material and simple processing jobs in
Mexico.'68 A gradual movement to a large, bilateral free market
for goods could enable Mexico to begin to resolve its pressing
problems of employment and income distribution. 69
163. Id. One Mexican attorney complains that companies still use antidurmping suits in Mexico
as some kind of fishing expedition and that the companies do not realize that the Mexican
government does not have the resources to investigate such complaints. Id.
164. Review of Trade and Investment Liberalization Measures by Mexico and Prospects for
Future United States-Mexican Relations, Phase H: Summary of Views on Prospects for Future United
States-Mexican Relations, USITC Pub. 2326, Inv. No. 332-282, at 1-23 (Oct. 1990) [hereinafter ITC
Phase 11].
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1-25.
167. See generally Green, supra note 76, at 4A.
168. Id.
169. ITC Phase 11, supra note 164, at 1-16.
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Third, a U.S.-Mexico FTA could increase Mexican productivity
and competitiveness in the world market. 170  When President
Salinas visited Europe, he was disturbed to discover that the
previous foreign interest in Mexico had turned to new opportunities
in the Eastern Bloc.17' A FTA would permit Mexican companies
to gain access to U.S. technology by encouraging production
sharing and joint ventures. 172 U.S.-Mexico joint ventures would
enable Mexico to develop expertise in international marketing and
industrial techniques to attract foreign interest. 173  Initially,
Mexico would enjoy economic and trade benefits in the world
market as a result of its lower wages. 74 As a result of these
international economic benefits, Mexico's inflation could
decrease.' 75
Fourth, a FTA would increase and accelerate capital and
investment flows.' 76 A FTA will stimulate a considerable amount
of direct investment from the U.S. in manufacturing, agriculture,
computers, automobiles, and service industries such as banking,
insurance, and securities. 177 Free trade will help Mexico attract
U.S. capital. Additionally, Mexican consumers will enjoy a broader
array of high quality imports.17  With this increased economic
activity, Mexico could begin to meet its foreign debt burden and
generate more foreign exchange. 179
170. K. FATEI~ supra note 77, at 6. See Green, supra note 76. Mexico's agriculture, cement
and textile industries would be most likely to benefit from increased access to U.S. markets. Id.
171. Bush and Salinas, supra note 103, at 835.
172. iTC Phase I% supra note 164, at 1-17.
173. S. WaNrrTAVB, supra note 9, at 175. However, Mexico is not a thoroughly
underdeveloped country, but rather has a substantial and growing technically educated population
with the ability to originate ideas and adapt research. Id. at 174.
174. Id.
175. ITr Phase 1I, supra note 164, at 1-17. See generally Trigueros, supra note 16, at 258
(explaining that the low price for oil in the 1980's and the debt crisis, resulting in an absence of
foreign funds, led Mexico to seek a more open, foreign trade strategy). However, with a more open
import strategy Mexico may no longer have as great a need to negotiate an FTA with the U.S.
176. McGreal, Salinas Incentive Mission in Bid to Woo Japanese, Independent, June 14, 1990,
at 29.
177. ITC Phase I, supra note 164, at 1-17.
178. Id.
179. S. WErnRAUB, supra note 9, at 173. "The investment in assembly plants, most of which
are along the U.S.-Mexican border, demonstrates the attraction of low wages for labor intensive
industries such as apparel and electronics.- Id. at 174.
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Finally, a FTA would increase the business confidence within
Mexico.'"0 One economist explains that
the government has made a point of signaling its intentions to
open up the economy and to begin implementing some changes,
and this has raised business confidence, which is now essential
to the ultimate success of the present economic program.
Therefore, a signal that Mexico is willing to consider a trade
agreement with the United States will open up new prospects
for Mexican industry and foreign investors and will contribute
to maintain confidence."'
2. Disadvantages for Mexico
Some experts cite the various disadvantages a U.S.-Mexico
FTA would have for Mexico. First, a U.S.-Mexico FTA may not
significantly benefit Mexican labor since a FTA would attract
assembly type operations to Mexico."8 2 Of all manufacturing jobs,
assembly type operations are the lowest paying and add the least
value to the economy. 3
Second, a FTA could be detrimental for Mexico's small and
medium-sized businesses.'84 As a result of a FTA, inefficient
manufacturers would need to compete due to an uneven effect on
Mexican companies. I"5 In addition, small companies would have
to learn to produce with quality.'86
180. ITC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-18.
181. Id. at 1-17.
182. Id. at 1-18.
183. A Boost for Both Countries, N.Y. Times, Jun. 16, 1990, § 1, at 20, col. 1. See generally
Free Trade Pact with Mexico Earns General Support, Though Reservations are Expressed, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1002 (July 4, 1990) [hereinafter Free Trade Pact] (Based on one expert's ratio,
$1 billion in exports creates 25,000 jobs).
184. IrC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-17.
185. Agenda for Bilateral Free Trade Agreement Talks Said to be Wide Open at this Point, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 956 (June 27, 1990).
186. Id.
577
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 4
3. Advantages for the United States
A U.S.-Mexico FTA could provide numerous advantages for
U.S. trade. A FTA could improve U.S. access to a growing
Mexican market.'87Since Mexico recently began reducing its
tariffs and liberalizing its import regime, U.S. exports to Mexico
already have increased significantly. 8 Industries in the U.S.
could gain a larger market for their products and gain access to a
cost-competitive labor supply with the help of a FTA. 89
If Mexicans prosper from a FTA, so too will Americans.
Mexicans would generally spend in the U.S. revenue earned from
Mexican exports to the U.S. t90 Actually, if low wage imports do
not come from Mexico, they would likely come from Asia whose
generated revenue would not be spent in the U.S.19
A FTA could create jobs in the U.S.'92 Although a FTA will
likely encourage many U.S. manufacturers to move part of their
production process to Mexico, most of the equipment and
components the manufacturers use will be created in and supplied
from the U.S. 93 In addition, employment would rise in high-tech
export industries. 94 Recently, Ambassador Hills explained that
it is not necessarily true that by reducing tariffs between two
nations, where there is a combination of lower wage rates, it
necessarily follows that one country will depress the others' wage
187. 1TC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-19. As a result of an FTA, low-paying jobs would
probably grow more scarce. Id.
188. Id. See Trautman, U.S., Mexico Face Long Journey to Reach Free Trade, Reuter Bus.
Rep., June 12, 1990. Generally, many groups fear that free trade "will entice U.S. fims to set up
shop in Mexico, where labor is relatively cheap, and flood the U.S. market with imports at a cost of
thousands of American jobs.' la
189. ITC Phase I% supra note 164, at 1-21.
190. Chute, U..-Mexico Free Trade Alarms Some Producers, Women's Wear Daily, June 13,
1990, at 24, col. 1.
191. AFL-CIO, supra note 108, at 1001. Beyond the wage differentials, the great differences
in regulatory structures and social protections may also cause serious difficulties for U.S. production.
Id.
192. Trautman, supra note 188. Some industries also voice concern that free trade would end
the quotas that now protect American steelworks and textile mills from Mexican steel and textiles.
Id.
193. ITC Phase If, supra note 164, at 1-21.
194. A NAFTA, supra note 1.
578
1991 / U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement
rates.19 What is possible, according to Hills, is a relegation of
the more primitive type of work to the country with the lower
wage rates while the other country would handle different types of
work.
19 6
The FTA could solidify Mexican economic liberalization and
provide greater certainty and predictability to U.S. investors.' 97
A FTA creates potential for greater investment security as well as
expanded investment opportunities attractive to industries. 9 8
Foreigners may also feel that when they invest in the U.S., they are
truly investing in a still greater area, North America.
The flow of illegal immigration into the U.S. could decrease
due to a FTA.' A strong and stable Mexican economy will
greatly diminish the crossings of Mexican workers to the U.S. and
consequently solve many illegal immigration problems.2" The
U.S. responds to Mexico's economic needs because of the
impossible task of controlling the 3100 kilometer border and
because of the wave of immigrants that would invade the U.S.
labor market if the Mexican economy failed.2"'
A U.S.-Mexico FTA, in combination with the U.S.-Canada
FTA, could help the U.S. compete more effectively in world
markets.2" The U.S. and Mexican economies complement each
other; this is a principal reason a ETA would be advantageous. 3
Although the Mexican and U.S. economies have disparate levels of
development, the two economies complement each other in
important matters such as cost of labor, levels of technology, and
growing seasons in the agricultural sctor.2' Mexico is richly
195. rrC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-13.
196. Id.
197. Mongelluzzo, supra note 127.
198. Free Trade Pact, supra note 183, at 1002.
199. Id. But cf. ITC Phase I% supra note 164, at 1-22. On the other hand, opponents of the FTA
argue that the U.S. would gain little from expanded access to the Mexican market given the relatively
low level of disposable income available in Mexico. Id.
200. ITC Phase I, supra note 164, at 1-15.
201. Id. Additionally, a FTA may create an increased demand for skilled U.S. labor. Id.
202. A Boost for Both Countries, supra note 183.
203. Trade Subcomm., supra note 105.
204. Id Nevertheless, some opponents of a FTA contend that border areas would be hurt
economically as a result of an FTA. I
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endowed with what the United States needs: oil, raw materials, and
cheap labor.2'5
The geography and culture of the two countries enhance the
possibilities of a FTA. Most experts feel that because of the close
proximity and cultural interaction that exist between the U.S. and
Mexico, cultural differences will not hinder development of a U.S.-
Mexico FTA.2" Some have noted that during the U.S.-Canada
FTA talks, Canada, being so similar to the U.S., was rightly
concerned about U.S. cultural domination on its society.2 7 In
contrast, since Mexico's "culture is so strong and distinctive," its
fear of U.S. domination should be minimal.2 8
Actually, the numerous similarities between the U.S. and
Mexico could cause the U.S.-Mexico negotiations to conclude in
considerably less time than it took to conclude the Canadian
agreement.2 0 The U.S.-Mexico FTA will have the advantage of
building on the results of the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations. 210 Additionally, the two countries may rely on the
Framework Agreement, Textile Agreement, and TIFIs which
already provide for comprehensive trade negotiations. Some experts
believe that negotiations could be completed as early as 1992.21
4. Disadvantages for the United States
A U.S.-Mexico FTA raises some concerns from U.S. opponents.
First, a FTA could cause job losses in the U.S. as companies shift
their production to a less expensive labor market in Mexico.1 2 A
205. ITC Phase , supra note 164, at 1-16.
206. Trade Subcomn., supra note 105.
207. TC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-16.
208. Id.
209. IBC USA LiCsNo, INc. PoLrcAL RISK SERVICES, COUNTRY REPORT ON MEXIco:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS, Aug. 1, 1990. But cf A NAFTA, supra note 1. One critical element
the FrA needs to address is whether the U.S. would accept the free movement of people so that all
the Mexicans who wanted to work in the U.S. could do so. ITC Phase I, supra note 164, at 1-6.
Some experts fear that the disparity between the countries income will provide a strong inducement
for illegal migration to the U.S. Id.
210. ITC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-12.
211. Id. at 1-13.
212. Mongelluzzo, supra note 127.
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FTA would most likely affect automobiles, steel, apparel, and
electronics. 213
Second, a FTA could hurt certain segments of U.S. industry
because the low-wage Mexican laborers would make U.S. products
noncompetitive. 214  For instance, the American Textile
Manufacturers Institute has strongly opposed a U.S.-Mexico FTA
because lower labor costs in Mexico could adversely affect their
industry.2 5 Economic officials with the AFL-CIO also warn that
a U.S.-Mexico FTA will only encourage greater capital outflows
from the U.S., lead to an increase in Mexican imports, and further
harm U.S. industries.216 In sum, opponents fear that a trade
agreement would send American money flowing southward and a
flood of Mexican labor northward.217
A third concern is that, as the FTA eliminates tariffs and as
U.S. matiufacturers of consumer goods gain more confidence in the
Mexican market, manufacturers will sell directly to Mexican
retailers and wholesalers; thus, retailers along the border will be
hurt.218 Formal integration sparks fears not only of bypassing the
border but also of bypassing the entire U.S. since Japan, and other
countries, could take advantage of the FTA by heavily investing in
Mexico and entering the U.S. market in a less public manner.219
V. NoRTH AMERICA, INCoRPORATED:
THE POSSIBILrrY OF A NAFTA
With the possibility of a U.S-Mexico FITA in the near future,
leaders have seriously proposed that Mexico join the U.S.-Canada
pact to form a North American free trade area, or even a North
213. K. FATEM, supra note 77, at 3.
214. ITC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-6.
215. Id.
216. Id.; but see id. at 1-5. However, some cite differences in traditions and languages as well
as the different levels of experience in conducting FFA negotiations as barriers to a bilateral
agreement Id.
217. Id. at 1-7.
218. Id.
219. 1rT Phase I, supra note 164, at 1-7.
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American common market." Given the geographic proximity
and intensity of economic relations, the commercial nexus between
the U.S., Mexico, and Canada has special importance.22'
Moreover, a clear complementary relationship exists between these
countries to export in various economic sectors such as clothing,
domestic appliances, plastic, and steel products.22
Immediately after Presidents Bush and Salinas met to begin
negotiating a comprehensive free trade pact between their two
countries, both U.S. and Canadian labor leaders quickly denounced
the initiative fearing that employers would rush to take advantage
of low Mexican wage rates. 3 Many felt Canada was vulnerable
to the adverse effects from a U.S.-Mexico FrA.224 Experts
worried that Canada would suffer shifts in both investment and
trade flows as businesses divert their investment to Mexico and the
U.S.225
However, many Canadian businesses warned that Canada would
be at a critical disadvantage unless they too secure guaranteed
access to the huge new continental market. 2 6 Many Canadian
businesses wish to protect the competitive advantages won under
the U.S.-Canada FTA.227 As a result, Canada recently decided to
join the U.S. and Mexico in proposed free trade negotiations.228
Likewise, U.S. and Mexican officials want Canada to join them in
a continental free trade pact."2 9 Meanwhile, some Mexican
business leaders who expected negotiations with Canada to take
place after the U.S.-Mexico FTA was underway are concerned that
220. Tlinmins, supra note 30, at 28.
221. Puche, Lineamientos para una estrategia comercial, in FoRo SOBRE LA POLmCA
COMNRCIAL DE MEXIco 529 (1990).
222. Id.
223. Wickens, supra note 1, at 20.
224. ITC Phase II, supra note 164, at 1-27.
225. Id. See generally Laver, Continental Murmurings: Mulroney Monitors Mexico's Free
Trade Moves, MAC.LAN's, Apr. 16, 1990, at 16. In U.S. dollars, Mexican workers earn an average
of $1.60 per hour compared with $12 to $14 per hour for Canadian workers. Il
226. Wickens, supra note 1, at 20.
227. Id. at 21.
228. Id. at 20.
229. Id. But see Newman, The Challenge from Mexico, MAcLEAN'S, June 25, 1990, at 68.
(expressing Canadian discontent with the idea of a Mexican FTA).
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Canada and the U.S. will form a common negotiating strategy that
could block potential concessions to Mexico.23°  However,
because the U.S. receives about 70% of Mexico's exports, while
Canada receives a mere 1.5%, the U.S. has good reason to be
careful and prudent when negotiating for a U.S.-Mexico FTA.231
Many obstacles to a NAFTA still exist, including issues of
labor flows, Mexican industries' fears, and Mexico's stability. A
NAF1A could in fact result in a kind of regional protectionism that
goes against the GATT's multilateralist policy.'2 Experts stress
that the three countries should pursue the option of minilateralism,
or trading blocs, in a manner consistent with the survival of the
multilateral system.'2
3
Many trade experts believe the integration of Mexico's
developing economy with the highly sophisticated economies of
Canada and the United States is inevitable.234 In essence, a
continent-wide free trade agreement would enable North America
to compete against rival trading blocs in Europe, Asia, and
throughout the world.235
VI. CONCLUSION
A U.S.-Mexico FTA is a natural step in a larger progression
leading to the establishment of a NAFA.236 Ambassador Carla
Hills, has stated that having stronger trade relationships enable
governments to work more closely together on a wide range of
political, economic, and social problems.237
230. Mexican Businesses Upset by Canadian Part in FTA Talks, Bus. Latin Am., Oct. 8,1990.
231. Mexico-U.S. Accords, supra note 5.
232. Id. See Mexico Says More Caribbean Trade Possible, Reuter Bus. Rep., July 31, 1990.
President Salinas has assured the island members of the Caribbean Community that a U.S.-Mexico
FTA will bring new opportunities for Caribbean nations. Id.
233. Free Trade Pact, supra note 183, at 1002. See Trade Subcomm., supra note 105. Since
trade blocs communicate exclusion, and the U.S. is a fervent multilateralist, it is important to continue
to put emphasis on multilateral liberalization. Id.
234. Wickens, supra note 1, at 20.
235. See Laver, Daring to Deal, MAcLEAN's, June 25, 1990, at 64.
236. AFL-CIO, supra note 108, at 1002.
237. Trade Subcomm., supra note 105.
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President Salinas has also acknowledged his desire to
strengthen Mexico in the global marketplace, explaining that an
intense globalization of the world markets and the revolution of
thoughts and technology has become alive to all, more than
ever."3 This history, Salinas admits, has risks for the nations but
also opens new opportunities for countries, like Mexico, that have
confidence in their culture and history, to participate in the world
and strengthen their independence."'
Previous agreements, such as the Framework Agreement and
TIFTs, illustrate the Mexican and American desire to economically
strengthen their countries together. With the U.S.-Canada FTA as
an archetype, the two countries should begin to grapple with more
difficult issues such as dismantling tariffs and nontariff barriers
(NTBs), opening investment and services, and standardizing
antidumping and CVD laws. Although, some oppose such a
bilateral agreement, the numerous advantages for both countries
(including a greater market for goods, increased access to cheap as
well as high-tech labor, and heightened productivity and
competitiveness in the world market) outweigh the FTA's possible
disadvantages.
A farsighted candidate for the U.S. presidency, in viewing the
U.S. Constitution as a model for the entire world, once said,
"Come Canada, come Mexico, come all the world, and let us be
brothers together under the glorious Constitution. ' 240 Years later,
the idea of a common market embracing Canada, Mexico and the
United States no longer appears far-fetched with the recent U.S.-
Canada FTA and talk of a U.S.-Mexico FTA. Eventually, perhaps,
such a common market will lead to the universal world of free
trade which the United Nations Charter envisions.241
238. Salinas, supra note 82, at 524.
239. Id.
240. Tininins, supra note 83, at 31.
241. Id
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